

Gettier with Venn-like diagrams

Thiago X. de Melo

Outline

True Belief and Lottery cases

Justified True Belief and Gettier cases

After Gettier cases?

Zagzebski on the Inescapability of Gettier cases

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
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
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Zagzebski on the Inescapability of Gettier cases

Is True Belief *Knowledge*?



Is True Belief *Knowledge*? No!



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
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
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Is Justified True Belief *Knowledge*?



Is Justified True Belief *Knowledge*? No!



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
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
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
Perhaps supplement justification with a 4th condition?



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Perhaps strengthen justification?



Cornman, Lehrer and Pappas (**CLP**) propose the following as 4th condition:

A person S knows that P **iff** $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{i) } S \text{ believes that } P \\ \text{ii) } P \text{ is true} \\ \text{iii) } S \text{ is (well) justified} \\ \text{in believing that } P \text{ is true} \end{array} \right.$


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How does the CLP analysis fare against the Gettier cases that we saw?

- ▶ Broken clock?
- ▶ The Office's?
- ▶ Smith's coins?
- ▶ Fake barns?

Perhaps a different conception of justification altogether?



Reliabilist theories (like Plantinga's) requires the following:

A person S knows that P **iff** {

- i) S believes that P
- ii) P is true
- iii) S 's belief is **warranted** (that is, it is produced in S by S 's relevant faculties working properly in an environment that is appropriate relative to those faculties.

How would this analysis fare against the Gettier cases that we saw?

- ▶ Broken clock?
- ▶ The Office's?
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True Belief and Lottery cases


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
Let justification+ whatever conception of justification you want

(That is, justification+ can be supplemented justification, strengthened justification, or an externalist sort of justification like warrant.)




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


Is justified+ true belief *knowledge*?


Zagzebski argues that, given some assumptions, any such analysis is susceptible to counterexamples of the Gettier kind.




To understand, let us take a step back




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
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
Back to our question: Is justified+ true belief *knowledge*?



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Back to our question: Is justified+ true belief *knowledge*?



What generates the problem for JTB, then, is that an accident of bad luck is cancelled out by an accident of good luck. The right goal is reached, but only by chance.

[Normal case:] "Suppose that Mary has very good eyesight, but it is not perfect. It is good enough to allow her to identify her husband sitting in his usual chair in the living room from a distance of fifteen feet in somewhat dim light (the degree of dimness can easily be specified). She has made such an identification in these circumstances many times [...] Her faculties may not be functioning perfectly, but they are functioning well enough, so that if she goes on to form the belief 'My husband is sitting in the living room', that belief has enough warrant to constitute knowledge when true and we can assume that it is almost always true.

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["Bad luck" situation:] Suppose Mary simply misidentifies the chair-sitter who is, let us suppose, her husband's brother. Her faculties may be working as well as they normally do when the belief is true and when we do not hesitate to say it is warranted in a degree sufficient for knowledge [...]. In spite of well-functioning faculties and a benign environment, she just makes a mistake.

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- ▶ Does Mary believe that her husband is sitting in the living room?
- ▶ Is it true that her husband is sitting in the living room?
- ▶ Is Mary's belief justified?
- ▶ Is Mary's belief warranted?
- ▶ Does Mary know that her husband is sitting in the living room?